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 A Comparison of the 1980s and 1990s
Abstract
We investigate efficiency and productivity growth of the U.S. banking industry over the latter part of the
1980s and first part of the 1990s using comprehensive data on U.S. commercial banks.  Cost efficiency decreased
slightly between the 1980s and 1990s and large banks showed a sizable decline in profit efficiency.  Total
predicted production costs increased over both the 1980s and 1990s, reflecting cost productivity declines.
Changes in business conditions led to cost declines over both periods.  Total predicted profits increased in the
1980s and 1990s, with the entire change reflecting increased profit productivity.  Changing business conditions
led to small declines in profits.Efficiency and Productivity Change in the U.S. Commercial Banking Industry:
 A Comparison of the 1980s and 1990s
I.  INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates the efficiency and productivity change of the U.S. banking industry over the latter
part of the 1980s and first part of the 1990s.  We are motivated by the importance of the banking sector to the
economy as a whole and by the tremendous transformation that this industry is undergoing.  Our other goal is to
promote a set of concepts and techniques for analyzing efficiency and productivity change that is applicable to
any industry in any country—cost, standard profit, and alternative profit efficiency and productivity change.  We
believe that the joint application of these methods—each of which provides some independent information and
each of which is valid under somewhat different assumptions—provides a comprehensive look at industry
efficiency and productivity growth that would be difficult to match with any single cost or profit function method
or with any single cost, profit, or productivity ratio.
The banking industry accounts for 3% of GDP according to the National Income and Product Accounts,
but this industry’s efficiency and productivity growth has far greater than proportional import to the functioning
of the economy as whole.  Banks provide liquidity, payments, and safekeeping services for depositors and
intermediate their funds into investment and working capital resources for nonfinancial industries.  Banks play
a special role in funding small businesses, which often have very limited access to other sources of external
finance.  Banks also maintain a smoothly functioning payments system that allows financial and real resources
to flow relatively freely to their highest-return uses.  Thus, inefficiency or productivity problems in the banking
industry can have significant consequences across a wide range of nonfinancial firms and industries.
The most striking aspect of the transformation of the U.S. banking industry is its consolidation.  The
number of banks has declined from more than 14,000 in 1980 to about 9500 in 1996, mostly from mergers and
acquisitions.  Over the 1980s and first half of the 1990s, there were over 3,500 mergers in which two or more
banks were consolidated under a single charter, as well as more than 5,800 acquisitions in which banks retained
their individual charters but became owned by different bank holding companies (BHCs).  In the first half of the
1990s, bank mergers involved about 20% of industry assets each year, and BHCs that acquired other banks
constituted about another 20% of the industry in each of these years (Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell, 1997).
This consolidation is primarily a result of the lifting of geographic barriers to competition, and this trend will
likely continue under the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, which allows virtually2
nationwide branching as of  June 1, 1997.  This relaxation of barriers to competition and the resulting increase
in competitive pressures are expected to drive institutions toward becoming more efficient and to raise
productivity growth in the long term.  Other changes in the banking industry include the expansion of banking
powers, changes in capital requirements, the removal of interest rate ceilings on deposits, innovations in financial
engineering, increased competition from nonbank rivals and foreign competitors, and the application of new
information-processing technologies.  These fundamental changes likely have important consequences for
industry efficiency and productivity change and, by extension, important consequences for the economy as
whole, but quantification of these effects has been fairly elusive.
There has been a substantial research effort into studying bank efficiency, but a more modest effort into
measuring productivity change in this important industry.  The efficiency and productivity growth studies have
differed in the efficiency/productivity concepts used, measurement methods used, and potential correlates
specified that may explain some of the variations in efficiency and productivity change.  Since the studies varied
in so many dimensions, it is difficult to determine the important factors leading to the differences in results. To
try to resolve this problem for efficiency measurement, Berger and Mester (hereafter BM) (1997) studied the
sources of differences in bank efficiency by applying different efficiency concepts, different measurement
methods, and different potential correlates of efficiency to the same data set.  Their findings suggested that each
of three efficiency concepts—cost, standard profit, and alternative profit efficiency—adds some independent
informational value.  The efficiency results were remarkably robust to the different measurement techniques,
different functional forms, and various treatments of output quality used.  Treatment of equity capital was found
to be an important consideration.
In this paper, we extend the analysis to compare bank efficiency and productivity change between the
last six years of the 1980s and the first six years of the 1990s.  Our data set includes annual information from
1984 through 1995 on virtually all U.S. commercial banks—over 145,000 annual bank observations in all. 
Cost, standard profit, and alternative profit efficiency and productivity change are measured.  Cost
efficiency uses a cost function to measure how close a bank’s cost is to what a best-practice bank’s cost would
be for producing the same output quantities when facing the same market prices of variable inputs and other
variables. Similarly, cost productivity change measures the proportional change in costs from one year to another3
for the same variables, all measured at the industry mean.  Standard profit efficiency and productivity change are
based on a variable profit function that includes revenues as well as costs, and takes as given market prices for
outputs, rather than treating the output quantities as given.  The standard profit measures embody everything that
is in the cost measures plus the revenue and cost effects of failing to choose output mix and scale optimally.
Alternative profit efficiency/productivity change keeps the revenues as in the standard profit approach, but
specifies output quantities instead of output prices.  As discussed in BM (1997), the alternative profit approach
may be informative when some of the assumptions underlying the cost and standard profit measures are not met.
Our efficiency/productivity measures are based on economic optimization in response to relative prices,
rather than optimization based just on the physical technology.  The cost, alternative profit, and standard profit
functions account for input prices and the standard profit function accounts for output prices.  So measures based
on these functions take account of allocative inefficiency as well as technical inefficiency.  Thus, a bank’s use
of more of a relatively high priced input than is optimal will be measured as an inefficiency or as a decline in
productivity, even if no more output could be produced from the same inputs.  Efficiency/productivity measures
that do not account for relative prices and allocative inefficiency are incomplete in an important way in our
opinion.
The total change in industry cost or profits over time may be decomposed into two elements—
(1) productivity growth, which is the proportional change in cost or profit for a given set of “business conditions,”
and (2) the change in costs or profits due to the “business conditions” themselves, which are simply the
exogenous variables specified in the cost or profit function.  Both elements are measured below.  Productivity
growth may be further decomposed into two parts—(1) the movement of the best-practice efficient frontier, and
(2) the change in the average degree of efficiency or the dispersion of firms away from this frontier.  The efficient
frontier is measured in terms of what the best-practice firms do, rather than any “true” minimum costs or
maximum profits that cannot be measured.  The movements of the frontier may be driven by technological
change, such as improvements in information-processing technologies or improvements in applied finance that
allow banks to make better investments at lower cost.  The frontier may also be moved by regulatory changes that
affect costs or profits, such as the deregulation of interest rates or relaxation of geographic entry barriers.  The
location of the best-practice frontier also depends on competitive conditions, since even the managers of the best-4
practice banks may reduce effort or pursue goals other than cost minimization or profit maximization if
competition is lax.  In our analysis, we measure total productivity change by using average-practice cost and
profit functions that are based on data from all banks, and we measure movement of the best-practice efficient
frontier by estimating cost and profit functions for only the best-practice quarter of the banks.
It is quite possible for the efficient frontier to either improve or worsen over time, and prior literature has
found movements in both directions.  Although technological retrogression is unlikely, changes in regulation and
competitive conditions can result in worse performance of the best-practice banks, and this has sometimes been
found in the literature.  Changes in regulation and competition can affect the average industry inefficiency or
dispersion from the frontier as well, which may also affect measured productivity change positively or negatively.
Our findings show some decrease in cost efficiency between the 1980s and 1990s.  Considering all banks,
there is little change in profit efficiency between the 1980s and 1990s, but large banks did show a sizable decline.
The total predicted cost of production increased over the 1980s and over the 1990s, reflecting a decline in cost
productivity.  Changes in business conditions led to cost declines over the two periods.  Total predicted profits
increased in the 1980s and 1990s, with the entire change reflecting increased profit productivity.  Changing
business conditions led to small declines in profits.
Section II reviews prior information on bank productivity change.  Section III lays out our efficiency and
productivity concepts, and Section IV gives the design of our empirical analysis.  Section V shows our efficiency
results, and Sections VI and VII display our productivity results for the whole sample and for separate size
classes, respectively.  Section VIII draws conclusions.
II.  PRIOR ANALYSIS OF BANK PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE
The literature on efficiency in the financial services industry has been extensively reviewed elsewhere
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997), so we omit a review here.  Less is known about productivity growth in the banking
industry.  We first briefly discuss what some government agencies do, and then cover a handful of academic
studies to give a flavor of the research, but this is by no means a comprehensive review.
Government agencies typically measure productivity growth by the change in a ratio of an output index
to an input index.  The BEA measures gross product originating (GPO) by industry (often referred to as “value-
added” by industry), divided by labor hours in that industry.  For banking, the value-added is determined5
primarily as !1 times the value of interest paid on deposits less the interest received on loans, which is reckoned
to be the value of services provided free to depositors.  Productivity growth between benchmarking dates (every
5 years) is measured by the change in this value-added per labor hour.  However, for non-benchmark years, GPO
in banking is estimated by simply extrapolating the labor input measure, so no productivity growth can be
estimated.   The BLS measures physical banking output using a “number of transactions” approach based on time
deposits (number of savings accounts, club accounts, CDs, and other deposits), demand deposits (number of
checks written and cleared, and number of electronic funds transfers), loans (number of new loans extended),
and trust accounts (number of these accounts), each weighted by the proportion of man hours used in each
activity.  Again, labor hours are used as the denominator of the productivity index.  The use of labor hours in both
the BEA and BLS measures does not account for the increase in “outsourcing” of certain back-office operations
to holding company affiliates, which are still measured in bank costs, but not as bank labor.  See Griliches (1992),
Dean and Kunze (1992), Mohr (1992), and Yuskavage (1996) for more information on these measures.  Fixler
and Zieschang (1997) propose a promising method for measuring bank output that incorporates both the financial
approach of the BEA and physical production approach of the BLS; Fixler and Hancock (1997) propose a method
of measuring the credit services of banks.
These ratios do not have some of the benefits of the cost and profit productivity measures in our opinion.
The use of a single index of bank output does not fully account for allocative inefficiencies or differences in
product mix across banks that affect banks’ costs and profits.  For example, a product mix that generates higher
revenue will not be measured as an increase in productivity growth, as it would in a standard profit productivity
measure.  Because the output measures are not regressed on prices or other control variables, the government
productivity indexes do not separate out “business conditions,” but rather measure productivity change and
changes in business conditions together.  Similarly, the government measures do not separate out movements of
the best-practice efficient frontier from changes in the inefficiency or dispersion from the frontier, so it is difficult
to draw conclusions about whether technology is improving versus whether more banks are taking advantage of
existing technology.  Finally, there may be difficulties with using labor as the single input.  It has been shown
that the ratio of labor to costs has changed dramatically over time (Berger and Humphrey, 1992), and that BHCs
have moved many of their operations outside the bank itself, so that costs are incurred, but the labor may be6
employed elsewhere in the holding company (Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise 1995).
Several academic studies have measured cost productivity.  Our discussion will slightly reinterpret some
of their results using our own terminology.  The literature often calls shifts in the best-practice frontier
“technological” change, but we prefer to keep explicit the distinction between technology used by the best-
practice banks and the theoretically best technology available.
Berger and Humphrey (1992) used the thick frontier approach to compare bank cost efficiency and to
study movements in the best-practice frontier between 1980, 1984, and 1988 using a complete sample of U.S.
banks.  These three years correspond to pre-, mid-, and post-deregulation of the deposit side of banking.  As
discussed above, shifts in the frontier over time may reflect changes in the technology used by the best-practice
banks, regulation, or other competitive conditions.  The authors found that when the shifts are not adjusted for
changes in business conditions, average costs increased for all but the very largest efficient banks in the 1980-84
interval, followed by decreases in average costs for all sizes in the 1984-88 period.  The increase in costs in the
earlier period was larger for the smaller banks in the sample.  This reflected the increase in deposit rates that
occurred in the 1980-84 period because of deregulation, and the fact that smaller banks use a larger proportion
of deposits to fund their assets than do larger banks.  The decline in average costs in the later interval reflected
a general decline in market rates that affected deposit rates and rates on purchased funds about equally.  When
the shifts in the average cost frontiers were adjusted for changes in the exogenous variables in the cost function
and market rates, an increase is still shown for the 1980-84 period, but a decrease is no longer shown for the
1984-88 period.
Bauer, Berger, and Humphrey (hereafter, BBH) (1993) used a panel data set of 683 banks with over $100
million in assets from states that allowed branching and that were continuously in existence during 1977-88 to
estimate total factor cost productivity growth for the best-practice banks.  Their estimates ranged from an average
annual growth rate over the period of !2.28% to 0.16%, depending on the estimation method used.  The poor
productivity growth was attributed to higher costs of funding due to high market rates, elimination of deposit rate
ceilings, and increased competition from nonbank financial intermediaries, which increased demand for funds
and reduced the supply of deposits.  Instead of compensating for this increase in input price by closing branches
or substituting ATMs, increased competition forced banks to provide more in the way of convenience.  Hence,7
banks increased the number of branches over the 1980s, in addition to paying higher deposit rates and providing
the ATM innovation.  The increase in deposit rates, increase in nonbank competition, and better convenience all
made consumers of bank services better off, but because quality of service is difficult to account for in the
estimation, the higher quality showed up as a decrease in productivity.
Humphrey (1993) used the same data set to investigate the effect on costs from shifts in the cost function
from 1977-88.  Measures were derived in three ways: from a simple time trend; from a time-specific index; and
from annual shifts in cross-section cost functions.  All three methods yielded similar estimates, with shifts in the
cost function implying cost increases averaging 0.8% to 1.4% per year, and small banks (with assets of $100-
$200 million) experiencing a larger decline than large banks.  Humphrey attributed the decline in productivity
to deregulation of deposit rates.  As the cost of deposits rose, banks found themselves to be “overbranched,” and
the productivity of their deposit base declined.  As support for this hypothesis, he found that in the pre-
deregulation period (1977-80), productivity increased, while during deregulation (1981-82), productivity
declined substantially, and in the post-deregulation period (1983-88), it showed little change.
Again using the same data set, Humphrey and Pulley (1997) estimated changes in predicted bank profits
in the 1977-88 period and decomposed the changes that occurred after deregulation (1984-88) into internal, bank-
initiated adjustments to the new regulatory structure and external, contemporaneous changes in banks’ business
conditions.  They found that for banks with assets over $500 million, the rise in profits from the 1977-81 period
to the 1981-84 period resulted from a shift in the profit function, by changing deposit and loan prices, and
changing the use of labor, capital, and funding inputs in response to deregulation.  In contrast, shifts in the profit
function did not account for the rise in larger banks’ profits from 1981-84 to 1985-88.  Rather, this rise was due
to higher levels of deposits, loans, other assets, and changes in input prices.  For smaller banks, with assets
between $100 million and $500 million, the authors found that there was little increase in profits between 1977-
81 and 1981-84, and in the later period, their experience was similar to that of larger banks.  Repeating their
analysis abstracting from changes in bank efficiency, they found larger changes in profits, but the pattern was
the same, with shifts in the profit frontier dominating the earlier period and changes in business conditions
dominating the latter.
Devaney and Weber (1996) investigated whether the market structure of rural banking markets affectedln C ' fC(w,y,z,v) % ln uC % ln C .
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See BM (1997) for a fuller discussion.
1
the banks’ productivity growth over 1990-93.  They used linear programming, rather than stochastic techniques,
to calculate the Malmquist productivity index, which decomposes productivity changes into changes in
efficiency, shifts in the production function, and changes in the scale of operations.  Since these measures are
based on quantities of outputs and inputs without regard to prices, there is no way to determine whether banks
became more or less productive in an economic sense or responded more or less appropriately to market price
signals.  The authors found positive productivity growth at rural banks over 1990-93.  Shifts in the production
frontier were the driving force of this productivity growth.
Wheelock and Wilson (1996) also used the linear programming approach to investigate bank productivity
growth, decomposing the change in productivity into its change in efficiency and frontier shift components.  They
found that larger banks (assets over $300 million) experienced productivity growth between 1984-93, while
smaller banks experienced a decline.  Average inefficiency remained high in the industry, since banks were not
able to adapt quickly to changes in technology, regulations, and competitive conditions.
III.  THE EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY CONCEPTS
We focus on three economic concepts from which efficiency and productivity measures will be
derived—cost, standard profit, and alternative profit.  We prefer these concepts, since they are based on economic
optimization in reaction to market prices, rather than being based solely on the use of technology.
1
1.  Cost.  The cost function relates variable costs to the prices of variable inputs, the quantities of variable
outputs and any fixed netputs, environmental factors, and random error, as well as efficiency:
(1)
C measures variable costs, f  is some functional form, w is the vector of prices of variable inputs, y is the vector C
of quantities of variable outputs, z indicates the quantities of any fixed netputs, v is a set of environmental
variables that may affect performance, u  denotes an inefficiency factor that may raise costs above the best- C
practice level, and   denotes random error.  The term, ln u +  ln  , is treated as a composite error term, and the CC C  
various efficiency measurement techniques differ in how they distinguish the inefficiency term, ln u , from the C
random error term, ln  .   C
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if the bank were as efficient as the best-practice bank in the sample facing the same exogenous variables (w,y,z,v)
divided by the actual cost of bank b, adjusted for random error, i.e.,
(2)
where u  is the minimum u  across all banks in the sample.  Cost efficiency ranges over (0,1], and equals one
ˆm i n ˆb
CC
for a best-practice firm within the observed data.
The total change over time in an industry’s costs reflects changes in productivity and changes in the
exogenous variables that affect costs, which we refer to as “business conditions.”  The change in predicted total
costs (with random error removed) between periods t and t+1 is given by:
(3)
where X / (w ,y ,z ,v ), u  is the inefficiency factor, and C is the estimated “average-practice” cost function, t t t t t  C ˆ
which is estimated using all banks and embodies inefficiency.  Note that this is a gross cost change, so, e.g., if
costs go up by 5%, our total cost change would be 1.05.
The first term on the right-hand-side of (3) represents productivity change, i.e., 
(4)
and the second term on the right-hand-side of (3) represents changes in business conditions, X:
(5)
A change in the scale of operations would be included as a change in business conditions for the cost function,
since output quantities are included in the exogenous variables of the cost function.
As noted above, productivity change comprises the movement of the best-practice frontier and change
in inefficiency, or dispersion from the frontier.  Movement in the best-practice cost frontier is given by:
(6)
where f  is the estimated best-practice cost frontier, which excludes the inefficiency term.   ˆ
C
In this paper, we will always estimate the total change, productivity change, and frontier change
evaluated at the same X, the mean values of ln w, ln y, ln z, and ln v over all the banks in the sample for the year ttt t
in question.  It is important to remember that frontier change here means changes in the practices used by the best-
practice firms, which depend on technology, regulation, and competitive conditions.  As discussed above, any
of the changes we measure can be positive or negative.ln ( % ) ' f (w,p,z,v) % ln u % ln .
Std EFF b ' ˆb
ˆmax '
exp[ˆ f (w b,p b,z b,v b)] × exp[ln ˆ u
b] &
exp[ˆ f (w b,p b,z b,v b)] × exp[ln ˆ u
max] &
ln ( % ) ' fa (w,y,z,v) % ln ua % ln a .
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2.  Standard profit.  The standard profit function takes variable output prices as given but allows output
quantities to vary, so that it accounts for revenues that can be earned by varying outputs as well as inputs:
(7)
 is the variable profits of the firm, which includes all the interest and fee income earned on the variable outputs
minus variable costs, C, used in the cost function;   is a constant added to every firm’s profit so that the natural
log is taken of a positive number; p is the vector of prices of the variable outputs; ln   represents random error;
and ln u  represents inefficiency that reduces profits.
Standard profit efficiency measures how close a bank is to producing the maximum possible profit given
a particular level of input prices and output prices (and other variables).  Efficiency measures based on the profit
function allow for inefficiencies in the choice of inputs (like the cost function does) but also in the choice of
outputs when responding to output prices or to any other arguments of the profit function.  Thus, profit efficiency
is more comprehensive than cost efficiency and gives a better measure of the overall performance of the firm.
Standard profit efficiency is the ratio of the predicted actual profits to the predicted maximum profits
of a best-practice bank facing the same business conditions, net of random error, or the proportion of maximum
profits that are actually earned:
(8)
where u  is the maximum value of u  in the sample.  Profit efficiency ranges over (!4,1], and equals one for
ˆm a x b
a best-practice firm within the observed data.   Unlike cost efficiency, profit efficiency can be negative, since
firms can throw away more than 100% of their potential profits.
We define the total change, productivity change, business conditions change, and frontier change for
standard profits in a similar way to costs.  For example, standard profit frontier change is the ratio of predicted
best-practice profits for year t+1 to those for year t, both evaluated at the mean values of ln w, ln p, ln z, and ttt
ln v. r
3.  Alternative profit.  The alternative profit function is identical to the standard profit function in (7)
except that y replaces p in the function f, yielding different values for the inefficiency and random error terms:
(9)
The efficiency and change statistics are calculated in the same way as the standard profit measures except11
It would be useful, e.g., if (i) there are substantial unmeasured differences in the quality of banking
2
services; (ii) outputs are not completely variable; (iii) output markets are not perfectly competitive; and/or (iv)
output prices are not accurately measured.  See BM (1997) for further details.
Major Call Report changes implemented in 1984 made it difficult to include the earlier part of the
3
1980s.
We use the state-average input or output price if the market-average price is likely to be, or appears to
4
be, unreliable (e.g., if the bank accounts for most of a market’s deposits, the market-average price would not be
representative of the market, since it is constructed by omitting the bank).  See the footnote to Table 1.
for this change in the arguments of the profit function.
The concept of alternative profit may be helpful when some of the assumptions underlying the cost and
standard profit functions are not met.
2
IV.  EMPIRICAL DESIGN
Our data set includes annual information on virtually all U.S. commercial banks from 1984 through 1995;
thus, we have over 145,000 observations (over 80,000 observations for the 1980s and over 65,000 for the 1990s).
Most of the data are from the Reports of Income and Condition (Call Reports).
3
1.  Variables included in the cost and profit functions.  Table 1 gives the definitions of all the variables
specified in the cost and alternative profit functions, as well as their sample means and standard deviations for
the periods 1984-89 and 1990-95.  The variable input prices, w, include the interest rates on purchased funds and
core deposits as well as the price of labor.  These prices are calculated as exogenous market-average prices that
a bank faces.  In each MSA or non-MSA county in which a bank operates, we constructed the weighted average
of the bank prices in the market excluding the bank’s own price, where the weights are each bank’s share of the
total input usage in the market and each bank’s price is its expenditures on the input divided by its input quantity.
The bank’s input price is then the weighted average of the prices faced in each of its markets, where the weight
is the bank’s share of its deposits in that market.  The variable outputs, y, include consumer loans, business loans,
real estate loans, and securities, the latter category being measured simply as gross total assets less loans and
physical capital, so that all financial assets are considered to be outputs.  The prices of these outputs, which
appear in the standard profit function, are constructed as market-average prices, similar to the way in which input
prices are constructed.
4
We specify off-balance-sheet items, physical capital, and financial equity capital as fixed netputs, z.  For12
Hughes and Mester (1993 and forthcoming) and Hughes, et al. (1995) discuss the importance of
5
including equity in cost and profit function models.
If fewer than three years of data were available, then SDROA was set equal to zero.
6
BM (1997) found that both the translog and the Fourier-flexible functional form, which is a global
7
approximation that includes a standard translog plus Fourier trigonometric terms, yielded essentially the same
average level and dispersion of measured efficiency, and both ranked the individual banks in almost the same
order.
the off-balance-sheet items, we use the Basle Accord risk weights on the assumption that costs and revenues
should be approximately proportional to the perceived credit risk on which these weights are based.  We specify
these items as fixed instead of variable primarily because of the difficulty of obtaining accurate price information.
Since physical capital is slow to adjust, we treat it as a fixed input as well.
We include equity capital because it directly affects costs, as an alternative source of funding for bank
operations.  It may have an indirect effect via the risk premium a bank pays for uninsured deposits and nondeposit
funds, since financial capital provides a cushion against insolvency.    The specification of equity may also reduce
5
scale bias, as discussed in BM (1997).
Among the environmental variables, v, we include the log of the market-average nonperforming to total
loan ratio, ln MNPL, and its square, ½ (ln MNPL) , since dealing with exogenous loan problems raises costs and
2
lower profitability.  To control more directly for risk, we also include SDROA, the standard deviation of a bank’s
annual return on assets over the five, four, or three years prior to the date in question (choosing the longest for
which data were available) and NOSDROA, which equals one if there were fewer than three years of data for
the bank and zero otherwise.   We also specify controls for the geographic restrictions on bank competition
6
including branching restrictions (unit banking (UNITB), limited branching (LIMITB), with statewide branching
as the base case); the degree of in-state holding company expansion permitted (LIMITBHC); whether out-of-state
holding company expansion is prohibited (NOINTST); and the proportion of the banking industry’s assets held
in states allowed to enter the bank’s own state (ACCESS, ½ACCESS ).  Other controls include the Herfindahl
2
index of local deposit market concentration (HERF); state income growth (STINC, ½STINC ); whether the bank
2
is located in a metropolitan area (INMSA), and the identity of a bank’s federal regulator (FED, FDIC, with OCC
as the base case).
2.  Functional form.  The results presented below are based on the translog functional form.   Our
7ln (C/w3z3) ' % j
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We exclude factor share equations, which embody restrictions imposed by Shephard’s Lemma or
8
Hotelling’s Lemma, because these would impose the undesirable assumption of no allocative inefficiencies.
The homogeneity restriction does not have to be imposed on the alternative profit function, but it is
9
imposed to keep the functional forms equivalent.
specification of the cost function is:
(10)
where we have suppressed time subscripts; (y /z ), (z /z ), and the MNPL variables (included in v) have 1 added k3 r  3
for every firm in order to avoid taking the natural log of zero; and the standard symmetry restrictions apply.
8
The standard and alternative profit functions use essentially the same specification with a few changes.
First, the dependent variable for the profit functions replace ln (C/w z ) with ln [( /w z ) + *( /w z ) * + 1], 33 33 33
min
where *( /w z ) * indicates the absolute value of the minimum value of ( /w z ) over all banks for the same 33 33
min
year.  Thus, the constant   = *( /w z ) * + 1 is added to every firm's dependent variable in the profit function 33
min
so that the natural log is taken of a positive number, since minimum profits are typically negative.  Thus, for the
firm with the lowest value of ( /w z ) for that year, the dependent variable will be ln(1) = 0.  For the alternative 33
profit function, this is the only change in specification, since the exogenous variables are identical to those for
the cost function.  For the standard profit function, the terms containing the variable output quantities, ln (y /z ), k3
are replaced by the corresponding output prices, ln (p /w ). k3
All of the cost, profit, input price, and output price terms are normalized by the last input price, w , in 3
order to impose linear homogeneity on the model.   We also specify all of the cost, profit, output quantities, and
9
fixed netput quantities as ratios to the fixed equity input, z , to control for heteroskedasticity, to help control for 3
scale biases in the estimation, and to give the models more economic interpretation, since the dependent variable
in the profit functions becomes approximately ROE.
3.  Technique for estimating efficiency.  We estimate bank efficiency for our two subperiods, 1984-8914
Despite the assumption that random error for each bank averages out to zero over time, extreme values
10
of these inefficiency estimates may reflect substantial random components.  Thus, we use truncation to reassign
less extreme values to banks with the most extreme values in each of ten bank size categories for each subperiod.
We assign to each bank in the top and bottom 5% of the distribution of the average residuals in a size category
the value for the bank that is just at the 5th or 95th percentile, respectively.  Truncation is performed within each
of ten size classes (by gross total assets) to reduce the effects of persistently good or bad luck for these banks
relative to firms of their size.
Because the costs and profits in the dependent variables are expressed in terms of the ratios to w z ,
11
33
the exp[f(·)] terms in the efficiency ratios are replaced by w z ×exp[f(·)] for cost efficiency and w z ×exp[f(·)]!
ˆ ˆˆ
33 33
for profit efficiency, where f(·) is the predicted part of the cost or profit function.  To offset the nonlinearities
ˆ
introduced by exponentiating and including the   terms, in all but one case the predicted costs and profits are
multiplicatively adjusted so that the average predicted cost or profit for each year equals the average actual cost
or profit for the same year.  In one case (the standard profit function for 1990), this adjustment is not made, since
the profit numbers are close to zero and the multiplicative adjustment distorted the efficiency ratio.
and 1990-95, using the distribution-free method (Berger, 1993).  This method uses less arbitrary assumptions than
the more popular stochastic frontier approach to disentangle inefficiencies from random error, and it gives a
better idea of a bank’s longer-term performance, since the method bases efficiency estimates on several years
of data.  The method assumes there is a core inefficiency or average inefficiency for each firm over time.  The
core inefficiency is distinguished from random error by assuming that core inefficiency is persistent over time,
while random errors tend to average out over time.  Our efficiency estimates are based on six years of data.  One
banking study (DeYoung, 1997) found that this length of time balanced out concerns that the period be long
enough so that random errors average out and that the period be short enough so that core inefficiency was
constant over the period.
The cost, standard profit, and alternative profit equations are estimated separately for each year, 1984-95,
allowing the coefficients to vary to reflect changes in technology, regulation, and market environment.  For each
subperiod (1984-89 and 1990-95), the average residual for each bank b in the subperiod is formed, which is an
estimate of ln u,   ln u,  o r  ln  u  for the subperiod, depending on the equation.   The resulting estimates of the C a
bb b 10
inefficiency terms, ln u ,  ln u , and ln u , for the two subperiods, along with their minimum or maximum
^b ^ b ^b
C a
values ln u,   ln u , and ln u  in the subperiod, are then used to obtain each bank’s efficiency ratio for the
^ min ^ max ^ max
C a
subperiod.   We also compute efficiency measures for small banks (assets averaging under $1 billion in 1994
11
dollars over the six-year subperiod in question) and large banks (all other banks), separately, in two different
ways.  One is based on the frontier estimated using the full sample.  The other is based on separately estimated15
The cost and profit function coefficient estimates are available from the authors upon request.
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frontiers for small and large banks, which allow for the possibility that small and large banks may be using
different production technologies or are producing slightly different products.  For example, the typical $1
million of commercial loans for a small bank may represent services to 10 customers, whereas for a large bank
it might represent one-tenth of one customer.  
4.  Technique for estimating productivity changes and related measures.  To estimate the total changes
in costs or profits, productivity changes, and changes in business conditions for each year, we estimate “average-
practice” cost and profit functions without respect to inefficiency, and then apply the formulas in equations (3),
(4), and (5) for the cost function, and comparable ones for standard and alternative profit.  We present annualized
measures for 1984-95, 1984-89, 1989-95, and for each pair of consecutive years between 1984 and 1995.
Because different sized banks might have exhibited differences in productivity growth, we repeat the above
analysis for small banks and large banks separately (using their own frontiers).  (Here, small banks are those with
less than $1 billion (1994 dollars) in total assets in the year in question and large banks are all others.)
We also measure the frontier changes, as in equation (6), by reestimating the cost and profit function
models using only the best-practice efficient banks.  By using only the best banks to estimate the parameters, we
are able to trace shifts in the best-practice efficient frontier over time, abstracting from changes in inefficiency
or dispersion from the frontier.
We use a version of the thick frontier method to choose which banks are on the frontier each year (Berger
and Humphrey, 1991).  We divide the banks based on their residuals from estimating the average-practice cost
and profit functions, which use the data on all banks operating in the year.  Banks with residuals in the “best”
25% in their size category (i.e., lowest cost or highest profit) are assumed to be best-practice efficient for that
year (we use 10 asset size categories).  We then reestimate the best-practice cost and profit functions for these
most efficient quarter of banks (assuming that the residuals represent random error and not differences in
inefficiency). These estimated functions are treated as the cost and profit frontiers.
V.  EFFICIENCY RESULTS
Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of the efficiencies estimated for all banks and for large
and small banks for 1984-89 (hereafter, the 1980s) and 1990-95 (hereafter, the 1990s).   The mean cost
1216
This estimate is lower than the one found in BM (1997), which used a similar model specification but
13
a less comprehensive set of banks, used bank-specific rather than market-average prices, and omitted many of
our control variables in order to investigate potential correlates with efficiency.
efficiency for banks of all sizes in the 1980s is 0.806, which suggests that about 19.4% of costs were wasted, on
average, relative to a best-practice firm.  The 0.806 figure is consistent with the literature, which typically finds
about 80% cost efficiency for the 1980s.  For the 1990-95 period, we estimate average cost efficiency decreased
very slightly to 0.770, i.e., 77%.   The decrease in cost efficiency between the 1980s and 1990s might be
13
attributed to banks having to readjust after the large numbers of mergers many were involved in at the end of the
1980s and early 1990s.  However, the efficiency estimates give a measure of the dispersion of the banks from the
best-practice frontiers for the two subperiods and these frontiers may be different.  The lower efficiency estimate
for the 1990s need not indicate that banks are using more resources to produce a given level of output than they
were in the 1980s, since the cost frontier may have improved.  Our estimates of frontier change address this issue.
Also note that this slight decrease in efficiency may not be statistically significant.
Looking at the estimates for small and large banks separately (but still using the same frontier), we find
that the difference between the efficiency estimates for large and small banks was 1.2 percentage points in the
1980s and 2.5 percentage points in the 1990s.  The lower efficiency of smaller banks might be due to the fact that
these banks tend to operate in more concentrated markets and are more insulated from competitive pressures that
can drive firms toward efficiency.  Or it might reflect the fact that small banks are producing slightly different
products from large banks or are using a different technology.  The estimates of small and large bank efficiencies
based on their own frontiers can be used to check this possibility.   In general, the estimates are fairly similar to
those obtained using the frontier estimated for all banks.  As can be seen, relative to their own frontiers, small
banks showed higher average efficiency, i.e., were less dispersed from their own frontier, than were large banks
in the 1980s, but they had nearly identical efficiency measures in the 1990s.
The mean efficiencies for the standard and alternative profit functions for the 1980s and 1990s for all
banks are similar to each other, both showing that about half of the potential profits that could be earned by a
best-practice firm are lost to inefficiency.  The point estimate for standard profit efficiency is the same in the
1980s and 1990s, while there is only a small increase for alternative profit efficiency.  Our estimates are well
within the observed range from the few other profit efficiency studies.  The standard deviations of the profit17
BM (1997) recasted their estimates in terms of similar denominators and found that profit inefficiency
14
was larger than cost efficiency, as expected (i.e., there are revenue inefficiencies).
efficiencies are about 23 percentage points, suggesting that these efficiencies are quite dispersed, with many
firms earning considerably more or less than the average figure.  By contrast, the cost efficiencies are more tightly
distributed with a standard deviation of 6 to 8 percentage points.  Although the average profit efficiencies appear
to be lower than the average cost efficiency, these ratios are not directly comparable because they are reported
in terms of different denominators (predicted actual costs versus potential profits).
14
There do appear to be differences between small and large banks.  Although in the 1980s, small and large
banks have similar profit efficiencies, in the 1990s, small banks are considerably more profit efficient than the
large banks, with efficiency estimates (based on their own frontiers) 11 to 19 percentage points higher.  Since
small and large banks have similar cost efficiencies (based on their own frontiers) in the 1990s, the difference
in the profit efficiencies must reflect differences in revenue efficiencies.  Hence, large banks appear to be less
efficient either in setting output prices or output levels than smaller banks are.  This may reflect differences in
the types of customers large banks serve or the types of products offered.  Looking at changes in efficiency over
time, we see that for the large banks, efficiency decreased between the 1980s and 1990s: standard profit
efficiency for large banks, measured relative to their own frontier, fell from about 50% in the 1980s to less than
40% in the 1990s; similarly, alternative profit efficiency for large banks declined from 60% in the 1990s to less
than 50% in the 1990s.  For small banks, the change in efficiency between the 1980s and 1990s is quite minor.
We also examined the rank-order correlations among the different X-efficiency measures and some other
commonly used financial ratios that may be considered raw-data measures of efficiency (available from the
authors).  The general picture is the same for the 1980s and 1990s.  Standard and alternative profit efficiency are
highly positively and statistically significantly correlated with each other (  = 0.914 in the 1980s and 0.929 in
the 1990s), as expected.  The correlation of cost efficiency and the two profit efficiencies is statistically
significant but at a much lower level, in the 0.2 range for the 1980s and in the 0.15 range for the 1990s.  The
correlations between the efficiencies and each of the raw-data measures follow the expected pattern—efficiency
by any definition is negatively and significantly correlated with the standard average cost ratio, C/GTA / total
cost/gross total assets, and positively and significantly correlated with the standard profitability ratios, ROA and18
For the best-practice banks, predicted standard profit was negative for 1989; hence, we do not compute
15
the total change or frontier change for 1989-90.
ROE.  These findings suggest that our efficiency measures are robust and are not simply the consequences of our
specifications or methods.
VI.  RESULTS ON PRODUCTIVITY CHANGES AND RELATED MEASURES
Table 3 reports the total predicted change in costs and profits and the decompositions into productivity
changes and changes in business conditions.  These average-practice statistics are based on cost and profit
functions estimated using all banks and allow for inefficiency (i.e., the dispersion of banks from the frontier) to
change over time, as well as for the frontier to shift.  The frontier change statistics also reported in Table 3 are
based on estimations using only banks in the best cost and profit quarters; they reflect shifts in the frontier only
and abstract from changes in efficiency.  The first row in each table shows changes for the entire period 1984-95
(at an annual rate), with 1984 serving as base year.  The next two rows show the changes for the 1980s and 1990s,
respectively (both at an annual rate).  The other rows in the tables give the annual changes.  For the total change,
each subperiod change is the geometric mean of the yearly changes in that subperiod.  To abstract from the
volatility of the measures, we will focus on the changes for the 1980s and 1990s.   The annual changes are very
volatile from year to year, and probably less meaningful.  This is especially true for the change in profits.  For
example, 1989 was a good year for bank profitability but 1990 was a particularly bad year, and this is shown in
the very large drop in profit productivity between 1989 and 1990, and equally very large increase between 1990
and 1991.  Realized average profit was actually negative in 1990, but predicted profit for the average-practice
banks evaluated at the means of the exogenous variables was a small positive number, resulting in a nine-fold
increase in profit between 1990 and 1991.  Because predicted profit was so low in 1990, it was relatively easy
for banks to earn nine times the amount the next year.   We expect the change in profit and profit productivity
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to be more volatile than the change in costs and cost productivity, since profit is more volatile from year to year
than is cost.
As can be seen in Table 3, the total predicted cost of producing banks’ output was little changed over the
entire period.  Cost rose in the 1980s by about 1% annually and then fell about the same amount in the 1990s.
Looking at the decomposition, we see that changes in productivity and changes in business conditions worked19
in opposite directions.  Cost productivity decreased in both subperiods, with the 1980s showing a 6% annual
increase in costs and the 1990s showing a 9.5% annual increase.  Business conditions for bank costs improved
in both the 1980s and 1990s, but more so in the 1990s—in the 1980s, exogenous changes reduced costs by about
5%, while in the 1990s, these factors reduced costs by about 10%.  This reflects in part the drop in interest rates
in the 1990s.
Looking at the frontier change column, we see that shifts in the frontier increased bank costs in the 1980s
and more so in the 1990s, and that the effect of frontier changes on costs are generally less than the productivity
changes that allow for dispersion from the frontier.  In other words, banks on the frontier shifted toward more
costly production on average, and at the same time, the dispersion from this frontier increased.  This result is
consistent with what we reported in Table 2: that the average degree of efficiency decreased slightly between the
1980s and 1990s.  Both the shift in frontier technology and the decrease in efficiency worked to reduce
productivity between the 1980s and 1990s.
While these decreases in cost productivity and frontier change might seem surprising, our results for the
1980s are consistent with those of Berger and Humphrey (1992), BBH (1993), and Humphrey (1993).  These
papers attribute the poor and sometimes negative productivity change of banks in the 1980s to deregulation of
deposit rates and other increases in competition.  BBH argue that as banks lost some of their market power over
depositors, their costs rose.  Instead of being able to offset these costs with lower operating costs, e.g., by closing
branches and replacing them with ATMs, the increased competition the banks faced for deposits caused them
to increase the convenience offered to depositors in the form of a larger number of branches.  This increase in
convenience would not appear as increased cost productivity, but may show up as increased profit productivity
if banks were able to capture some of the benefit.  Otherwise, bank customers may have taken all of it themselves.
We look at this momentarily.
What is surprising in our cost results is that there is negative cost productivity and frontier change even
in the 1990s, when one would have thought the effect of deregulation of deposit rates would have already been
incorporated.  There are several possible explanations: (i) competitive pressures on banks have continued to
increase and banks have continued to react by increasing output quality, which raises costs, and banks have not
yet seen a revenue benefit from higher quality; (ii) increased competition might also have changed the banks’20
To test this possibility, we reestimated our measures using a sample of banks that were not involved
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in mergers for the year in question and at least the three previous years.  Our results are little changed,
suggesting that mergers are not a likely explanation.
clientele to one that is more costly to serve; (iii) new technology has changed the way banks do business and the
fixed costs of this new technology have not yet been recovered; (iv) the mergers many of these banks have
experienced might also have caused disruptions in production, temporarily raising costs (even if in the long run
the mergers will lead to reduced costs);  and (v) differences in the productivity of small and large banks and
16
changes in the proportions of these banks in the industry over time might be affecting the average productivity
measures reported for all banks.  We examine some of these differences in the next subsection.
Before turning to our profit results, it might be useful to compare our cost productivity results with the
BLS measures of commercial bank (SIC code 602) productivity.  One might expect that our measures would
agree, but the BLS measures indicate productivity increased an average of 2.49% per year in the 1984-89 period
and 3.48% per year in the 1989-95 period.  As explained in Section II above, the BLS statistics do not adequately
capture differences in product mix across banks, do not account for allocative inefficiencies, do not separate out
business conditions or shifts in the frontier, and focus on labor productivity rather than total factor productivity.
Turning to profits, the change in predicted standard profit and in predicted alternative profit are quite
similar over the entire period 1984-95, with standard profit showing an annual increase over 11% and alternative
profit an increase of almost 7%.  Comparing the change in profit estimates with our estimates for cost shows that
while costs increased over the period, revenues increased even more, so that profitability increased.  This
suggests that banks were receiving some payment for the increased convenience they were offering their
customers.
The decomposition shows that the increase in profits came entirely from increased productivity.
Changing business conditions led to a small decline in profits in the 1980s and 1990s of about 3% to 4% annually
each subperiod.  Note that since, on average for all sized banks, there was little change in the level of profit
efficiency between the 1980s and 1990s, the change in profit productivity mainly reflects an upward shift in the
profit frontier.  In terms of the standard profit function, frontier changes reflect changes in the banks’ choice of
output levels and use of inputs, while changes in business conditions reflect changes in output and input prices,
and other exogenous variables.  In contrast, for the alternative profit function, frontier change reflects changes21
in output prices and the use of inputs, while changes in business conditions reflect changes in output levels, input
prices, and other exogenous variables.  Our results differ from those of Humphrey and Pulley (1997), who did
not find positive productivity change between 1981-84 and 1985-88.
For both profits, but more so for standard profit, the increase in the 1980s was larger than the increase
in the 1990s.  This probably reflects the fact that 1989, the boundary year for our two subperiods, was a very good
year for bank profits.  This would tend to inflate the profit change for the 1984-89 period and deflate the change
for the 1989-95 period.  Had we instead chosen 1990 as the boundary, the 1980s would look much worse, and
the 1990s much better.
VII.  PRODUCTIVITY CHANGES AND RELATED MEASURES: LARGE VS. SMALL BANKS
We next examine whether small and large banks had different experiences in terms of productivity and
related changes over the 1980s and 1990s.  The estimates reported in Table 4 are based on functions and frontiers
estimated for small and large banks separately.  We do find some differences between small and large banks, the
main one being that the differences between the 1980s and 1990s are more pronounced for the large banks than
for the small banks (some of this might be because the sample of large banks is small), even though on average
over the entire period from 1984-95 small and large banks experienced similar changes in costs and profits.
There is little difference in the total change in costs for small and large banks over the 1980s and 1990s
subperiods.  Cost productivity declined for both small and large banks in both subperiods, but the decline was
considerably larger for large banks in the 1990s, with large banks experiencing about a 19% increase in costs due
to frontier change in the 1990s.  A countervailing effect was that changing business conditions were more
beneficial to large banks than to small banks in terms of their costs.  The results for standard profits are similar
to those for alternative profits, with both small and large banks showing an increase of about 6-7% in standard
profits in the 1980s and 1990s.  In terms of standard profits, productivity change, and especially frontier change,
was higher for larger banks in the 1990s than 1980s. In contrast, productivity change for small banks was
relatively stable for the 1980s and 1990s.
VIII.  CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates the efficiency and productivity growth of the U.S. banking industry for the latter
part of the 1980s and the first part of the 1990s.  Our results shed some light on how banks are responding to22
changes in technology, regulations, and business conditions, an important question given the tremendous
transformation this industry is experiencing and the importance of the banking sector to the economy as a whole.
We base our analysis on the cost, standard profit, and alternative profit concepts, which we believe are superior
to other measures (like simple ratios of cost to input or output to input), since they derive from economic
optimization in response to relative prices rather than optimization based just on the physical technology.  
We find that cost efficiency for banks of all sizes averaged about 80% over 1984-89 and declined slightly
to 77% over 1990-95 (this decrease may not be statistically significant).  Profit efficiency estimates are similar
for the standard and alternative profit function with banks showing about 50% efficiency in both subperiods.  In
the 1980s, small and large banks have similar profit efficiencies, but in the 1990s large banks are considerably
less profit efficient than small banks.  Although the average profit efficiencies appear to be lower than the average
cost efficiency, these ratios are not directly comparable because they are reported in terms of different
denominators (predicted actual costs versus potential profits).
Banks experienced an adverse shift of the cost frontier toward higher costs and negative cost productivity
change in both the 1980s and 1990s.  Changes in business conditions provided a countervailing effect, leading
to lower costs.  So, on net, there was little change in total costs.  The profit story is different, with banks
experiencing beneficial shifts in the profit frontier and profit productivity growth over the 1980s and 1990s.
Changes in business conditions hurt the banks in terms of profits.  The differences between the cost and profit
results point to the importance of examining all three measures—cost, standard profit, and alternative profit.  The
profit measures give a more comprehensive view of efficiency and productivity change in an industry than the
cost measures, since they incorporate revenues and the cost effects of failing to choose output mix and scale
optimally.23
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TABLE 1
Variables Employed in the Cost, Standard Profit, and Alternative Profit Functions
Means and Standard Deviations for 1984-89 and 1990-95
(All financial variables measured in 1000’s of constant 1994 dollars,
Prices of financial assets and liabilities are measured as interest rates.)
1984-89 1990-95
(80,014 obs.) (65,560 obs.)
Symbol Definition Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent Variables
C Variable operating plus interest costs, includes costs of purchased 18,439 236,847 17,118 224,197
funds, deposits, and labor.
Variable profits, includes revenues from loans and securities less 3615 36,853 3835 53,901
variable costs.
Variable Input Prices
w Market-average price of purchased funds (jumbo CDs, foreign 0.0623 0.0155 0.0446 0.0157 1
deposits, federal funds purchased, all other liabilities except core
deposits).
w Market-average price of core deposits (domestic transactions 0.0533 0.0148 0.0319 0.0129 2
accounts, time and savings).
w Market-average price of labor (1000’s of constant dollars per 31.6 5.45 33.2 6.24 3
employee).
Variable Output Quantities (Cost and Alternative Profit Functions Only)
y Consumer loans (loans to individuals). 29,973 233,319 34549 270,195 1
y Business loans (all loans other than consumer and real estate loans). 86,519 1,310,505 84,762 1,333,755 2
y Real estate loans. 49,881 412,305 82,457 652,836 3
y Securities (all non-loan financial assets, i.e., 105,593 1,072,634 138,480 1,423,613 4
Gross Total Assets ! y !  y !  y !  z) . 1233
Variable Output Prices (Standard Profit Function Only)
p Market-average price of consumer loans. 0.102 0.0273 0.0971 0.0241 1
p Market-average price of business loans. 0.125 0.0420 0.106 0.0359 2
p Market-average price of real estate loans. 0.0899 0.0174 0.0799 0.0145 3
p Market-average price of securities. 0.0616 0.0117 0.0368 0.0167 4TABLE 1, CON’T.
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1984-89 1990-95
(80,014 obs.) (65,560 obs.)
Symbol Definition Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Fixed Netput Quantities
z Off-balance-sheet items (commitments, letters of credit, derivatives, 28,802 620,588 39,429 847,100 1
etc.) measured using Basle Accord risk weights to be risk-equivalent
to loans.
z Physical capital (premises and other fixed assets). 4004 38,063 5102 52,371 2
z Financial equity capital. 16,790 138,960 25,196 212,944 3
Environmental Variables
MNPL Market-average of nonperforming loans (past due at least 90 days or 0.0480 0.0253 0.0315 0.0174
on nonaccrual basis) divided by total loans.
UNITB Dummy, equals one for unit banks in states. 0.249 0.433 0.0146 0.120
LIMITB Dummy, equals one for limited branching states.  0.593 0.491 0.475 0.499
STATEB Dummy, equals one for statewide branching states.  Excluded from the 0.150 0.357 0.501 0.500
regressions as the base case.
LIMTBHC Dummy, equals one for states with limits on expansions of multibank 0.556 0.497 0.481 0.500
holding companies.  As of 1990, all states permitted some multibank
holding company activity, so the excluded case is states that allow
statewide holding company powers.
NOINTST Dummy, equals one for states that do not allow interstate expansions 0.509 0.500 0.0344 0.182
of multibank holding companies.
ACCESS Proportion of nation’s banking assets in states that are allowed to enter 0.121 0.144 0.503 0.318
the state (equals proportion of national assets in the state for states that
do not allow interstate banking).
HERF Deposit Herfindahl index of local market concentration. 0.227 0.164 0.233 0.155
STINC Real state income growth (decimal) 0.0241 0.0300 0.0286 0.0231
INMSA Dummy, equals one if the bank is in a Metropolitan Statistical Area. 0.443 0.497 0.436 0.496
FED Dummy, equals one if the bank’s primary federal regulator is the 0.0772 0.267 0.0893 0.285
Federal Reserve.
FDIC Dummy, equals one if the bank’s primary federal regulator is the 0.587 0.492 0.603 0.489
FDIC.
OCC Dummy, equals one if the bank’s primary federal regulator is the 0.336 0.472 0.308 0.461
OCC.  Excluded from the regressions as the base case.TABLE 1, CON’T.
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1984-89 1990-95
(80,014 obs.) (65,560 obs.)
Symbol Definition Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
SDROA Standard deviation over past five, four, or three years (longest for 0.00519 0.00687 0.00499 0.0117
which data are available) of the bank’s annual return on assets.
NOSDROA Dummy, equals one if fewer than three years of data are available with 0.0425 0.202 0.0199 0.140
which to construct SDROA.
Notes: All stock values are real quantities as of the December Call Report and all prices market-averages of flows over the year divided by
these stocks.  The market-average price is the weighted average of the prices of the other banks in the market excluding the bank’s
own price, where the weights are each bank’s share of the total input usage or total output production in the market.  The bank’s price
is then the weighted average of the prices in each of the bank’s markets, where the weight is the bank’s share of its deposits in that
market.  We substitute the state-average price if the bank’s deposit share in the market is over 90%.  For the price of purchased funds
or core deposits, we also use the state-average price if the calculated market price of purchase funds or core deposits is more than 10
percentage points over the one-year Treasury bill rate or is less than the one-year Treasury bill rate.  For output prices, we use the
state-average if the calculated market price is more than 25 percentage points above or is less than the one-year Treasury bill rate.  We
also eliminated observations in which equity was below 1% of gross total assets because the data for such banks are suspicious.  All
of the continuous variables that can take on the value 0 have 1 added before taking logs in specifying the cost and profit regressions. 





(mean efficiencies, standard deviations in parentheses)
Cost Efficiency Profit Profit
Standard Alternative
 Efficiency  Efficiency
1984-89 All Banks 0.806 0.567 0.558
(0.0661) (0.233) (0.233)
      Number of Observations 11,040 10,997 10,982
Small Banks (based on all-sizes frontier) 0.806 0.567 0.557
(0.660) (0.232) (0.232)
      Number of Observations 10,693 10,659 10,640
Large Banks (based on all-sizes frontier) 0.818 0.577 0.592
(0.0684) (0.242) (0.251)
      Number of Observations 347 338 342
Small Banks (based on small-bank frontier) 0.805 0.572 0.565
(0.0656) (0.226) (0.225)
      Number of Observations     10,693 10,657 10,617
Large Banks (based on large-bank frontier) 0.785 0.534 0.600
(0.0711) (0.222) (0.247)
      Number of Observations 347 341 343
1990-95 All Banks 0.770 0.567 0.579
(0.0848) (0.229) (0.230)
      Number of Observations   9281   9275 9267
Small Banks (based on all-sizes frontier) 0.769 0.572 0.585
(0.0842) (0.223) (0.223)
      Number of Observations 8970 8969 8960
Large Banks (based on all-sizes frontier) 0.794 0.415 0.408
(0.0996) (0.337) (0.345)
      Number of Observations 311 306 307
Small Banks (based on small-bank frontier) 0.787 0.575 0.591
(0.0859) (0.221) (0.217)
      Number of Observations 8970 8969 8959
Large Banks (based on large-bank frontier) 0.792 0.384 0.480
(0.0903) (0.370) (0.316)
      Number of Observations 311 307 302
Small banks are banks whose total assets average less than $1 billion (in 1994 dollars) over the six-year period in question and large banks are all
others.  In computing the means, we exclude banks whose potential profits (i.e., predicted profits if the bank were on the frontier) are less than 0.001
times mean equity for the period.29
TABLE 3
Measured Bank Changes in Cost, Standard Profit, and Alternative Profit:
Total Change, Productivity Change, Frontier Change, Business Conditions Change
Cost Standard Profit Alternative Profit
Total Prod. Fron. Cond. Total Prod. Fron. Cond. Total Prod. Fron. Cond.
Change Change Change Change Change Change Change Change Change Change Change Change
Bus. Bus. Bus.
1984-95† 0.997 1.092 1.068 0.914 1.112 1.129 1.115 0.984 1.065 1.104 1.105 0.965
1984-89† 1.014 1.061 1.037 0.955 1.240 1.278 1.303 0.970 1.097 1.142 1.133 0.960
1989-95† 0.984 1.095 1.074 0.898 1.015 1.051 1.014 0.966 1.041 1.107 1.136 0.940
1984-85 0.973 1.071 0.921 0.909 1.142 1.278 1.041 0.893 1.116 1.169 0.910 0.955
1985-86 1.001 1.068 1.095 0.937 1.662 1.847 1.971 0.900 1.894 2.072 2.619 0.914
1986-87 0.910 1.067 1.171 0.853 0.755 0.636 0.560 1.187 0.426 0.433 0.429 0.982
1987-88 1.089 1.070 0.984 1.018 1.393 1.328 1.899 1.049 1.572 1.509 1.586 1.042
1988-89 1.109 1.002 0.995 1.107 1.471 1.378 1.549 1.067 1.122 0.998 1.002 1.124
1989-90 1.043 1.049 1.169 0.994 0.088 0.098 !4.270 0.901 0.385 0.407 1.321 0.946
1990-91 0.922 1.040 1.030 0.886 9.182 9.622      ‡ 0.954 1.420 1.689 0.990 0.841
1991-92 0.717 1.446 1.039 0.496 1.103 0.686 0.691 1.609 1.467 1.619 1.460 0.906
1992-93 1.178 1.433 1.130 0.822 0.733 0.950 0.846 0.771 1.157 1.909 2.253 0.606
1993-94 0.999 0.987 1.009 1.012 1.902 1.403 0.972 1.355 1.815 1.373 0.782 1.322
1994-95 1.118 0.968 0.689 1.155 0.882 0.824 0.697 1.070 0.753 0.622 0.561 1.211
Total Change =  for cost; ˆ( X) / ˆ (X) for standard profit; and aˆ( X) / a ˆ (X) for alternative profit. t + 1t + 1tt t + 1t + 1 tt
Prod. Change = C (X)/C(X) for cost; ˆ( X ) / ˆ (X) for standard profit; and aˆ( X ) / a ˆ (X) for alternative profit.  For cost, a positive number ˆ
t + 1ttt t + 1ttt t + 1t tt
ˆ
indicates a decrease in productivity.
Fron. Change = exp[f (X)]/exp[f (X)] for cost; {exp[f (X)]! }/{exp[f (X)]! } for standard profit; and {exp[f (X)]! }/{exp[f (X)]! } ˆ
Ct+1 t Ct t t+1 t tt a t+1 t a tt
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
for alternative profit.  For cost, a positive number indicates an adverse shift in the cost frontier toward higher costs.
Bus. Cond. Change = C (X )/C (X) for cost; ˆ( X) / ˆ (X) for standard profit; and aˆ( X) / a ˆ (X) for alternative profit. ˆ
t+1 t+1 t+1 t t+1 t+1 t+1 t t+1 t+1 t+1 t
ˆ
X = average value of X over all banks in the sample in year t. tt
† Annualized (i.e., cost or profit ratio raised to 1/(no. of years in the subperiod)).
‡Predicted standard profit in 1990 was negative.30
TABLE 4
Measured Bank Changes in Cost, Standard Profit, and Alternative Profit:
Total Change, Productivity Change, Frontier Change, Business Conditions Change
Small Banks
Cost Standard Profit Alternative Profit
Total Prod. Fron. Cond. Total Prod. Fron. Cond. Total Prod. Fron. Cond.
Change Change Change Change Change Change Change Change Change Change Change Change
Bus. Bus. Bus.
1984-95† 0.967 1.058 1.056 0.914 1.062 1.088 1.056 0.977 1.034 1.075 1.076 0.961
1984-89† 0.989 1.036 1.040 0.954 1.073 1.106 1.082 0.970 1.050 1.096 1.076 0.958
1989-95† 0.949 1.053 1.047 0.901 1.053 1.096 1.072 0.961 1.020 1.089 1.101 0.937
Large Banks
Cost Standard Profit Alternative Profit
Total Prod. Fron. Cond. Total Prod. Fron. Cond. Total Prod. Fron. Cond.
Change Change Change Change Change Change Change Change Change Change Change Change
Bus. Bus. Bus.
1984-95† 0.955 1.118 1.071 0.855 1.060 1.109 1.123 0.956 1.062 1.082 1.050 0.982
1984-89† 0.992 1.058 1.015 0.937 1.061 1.056 0.764 1.005 1.089 1.062 1.106 1.026
1989-95† 0.926 1.149 1.189 0.806 1.058 1.115 1.269 0.949 1.041 1.091 1.090 0.954
In any year in question, small banks are those with total assets less than $1 billion (in 1994 dollars) and large banks are all others.
Total Change =  for cost; ˆ( X) / ˆ (X) for standard profit; and aˆ( X) / a ˆ (X) for alternative profit. t + 1t + 1tt t + 1t + 1 tt
Prod. Change = C (X)/C(X) for cost; ˆ( X ) / ˆ (X) for standard profit; and aˆ( X ) / a ˆ (X) for alternative profit.  For cost, a positive number ˆ
t + 1ttt t + 1ttt t + 1t tt
ˆ
indicates a decrease in productivity.
Fron. Change = exp[f (X)]/exp[f (X)] for cost; {exp[f (X)]! }/{exp[f (X)]! } for standard profit; and {exp[f (X)]! }/{exp[f (X)]! } ˆ
Ct+1 t Ct t t+1 t tt a t+1 t a tt
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
for alternative profit.  For cost, a positive number indicates an adverse shift in the cost frontier toward higher costs.
Bus. Cond. Change = C (X )/C (X) for cost; ˆ( X) / ˆ (X) for standard profit; and aˆ( X) / a ˆ (X) for alternative profit. ˆ
t+1 t+1 t+1 t t+1 t+1 t+1 t t+1 t+1 t+1 t
ˆ
X = average value of X over all banks in the sample in year t. tt
† Annualized (i.e., cost or profit ratio raised to 1/(no. of years in the subperiod)).